State of Utah v. daniel Mario Munoz : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2002
State of Utah v. daniel Mario Munoz : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
James K. Slavens; Attorney for Defendant.
J Fredrick Voros, Jr.; Karen A. Klucznik; Attorney General\'s Office.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Munoz, No. 20020662 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2002).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3912
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DANIEL MARIO MUNOZ 
Defendant. 
CaseNo.:20020662-CA 
AMENDED REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED 
PRIORITY NUMBER 1 
ON APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
J. Fredrick Voros, Jr. 
Karen A. Klucznik 
Attorney General's Office 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-080 
James K. Slavens 
Attorney for the Defendant 
P.O. Box 752 
Fillmore, UT 84631 
FILED 
UWh Court of Appeals 
SEP 2 2 2003 
PauteiteStegg 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DANIEL MARIO MUNOZ 
Defendant. 
CaseNo.:20020662-CA 
AMENDED REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED 
PRIORITY NUMBER 1 
ON APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
J. Fredrick Voros, Jr. 
Karen A. Klucznik 
Attorney General's Office 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-080 
James K. Slavens 
Attorney for the Defendant 
P.O. Box 752 
Fillmore, UT 84631 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 4 
ARGUMENT 4 
1. The Court's Order and Findings on April 26. 2002 Regarding 
the State's Motion for Admission of Out-of-Court Statement by 
Child Victim/Witness at Trial was not proper. 4 
A. Excited Utterance Statement 4 
B. Video Recording 8 
C. Transcript 9 
D. Leading Questions 10 
2. It was reversible error to allow an uncle and niece 
(by marriage) to serve together on the jury. 11 
3. The Court should have granted Defendant's Motion for Leave 
to Withdraw as Counsel on April 25. 2002. 11 
4. The State violated the Defendant's Right to Remain Silent by 
allowing testimony that indicated that he exercised his right to 
remain silent. 12 
5. Whether or not the Court improperly allowed hearsay 
testimony into evidence. 12 
CONCLUSION 13 
2 - APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Pag 
1. State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993) 6 
2. State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862 (Utah 1989) 7 
3. Utah Rules of 11 (e)(1) 5& 
4. Utah Rules of 11 (e)(3) 6 
5. Utah Code Section 76-5-411(2) 7 
6. Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 15.5 8& 
7. Utah Rules of Evidence 801(c) 9 
3 - APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State provides in its Brief citations from the record supporting its position that 
the alleged victim was raped. It is important to note that the only testimony that the State 
can produce to support its position of the facts are based upon hearsay statements. The State 
did not produce any live testimony from a witness who had personal knowledge to support 
the State's position regarding the facts. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The Court's Order and Findings on April 26,2002 Regarding the State's 
Motion for Admission of Out-of-Court Statement by Child Victim/Witness at Trial was 
not proper, 
A. The Unrecorded Excited Utterance Statement 
On January 31, 2002, the State filed a motion for Admission of Out-of-Court 
Statement by Child Victim/Witness at Trial made to Officer Kimball at the hospital on the 
day of the alleged incident. On April 25, 2002, the Court held a contested hearing in 
response to the State's Motion. On May 6, 2002, the trial court signed an Order prepared 
by the State which allowed Officer Kimball to recount to the jury statements made to him 
by the alleged victim. The Court held that the statements fell under the "excited utterance" 
exception to hearsay. The Appellant is now challenging this order on appeal. 
As provided in Appellant's Brief, the Appellant takes exception with the Court's 
Order regarding the "excited utterance" statement on two fronts. First, the Appellant argues 
that the facts presented at trial in this case do not support the Court's finding that the 
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statements fell within the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. Instead the 
testimony presented at trial obviously demonstrated that the declarant had the wherewithal 
to protect her self-interest and was not under the influence of the startling event. Second, 
the Appellant argues that the trial Court erred by allowing the officer to provide a full 
account of her testimony instead of limiting his testimony. 
The State opposed the first of Appellant's position by first arguing that the Appellant 
failed to provide a transcript of the hearing on April 25,2002, then after that transcript was 
provided, argued that the Appellant failed to provide a transcript of the preliminary hearing 
to this Court. 
First, the Appellant complied with Utah Rules of 11 (e)(1) by providing this appellate 
court the transcript of which he "deems necessary" to support his position that the statement 
did not fall within the excited utterance exception to the prohibition against hearsay. The 
Appellant cited from the trial record the following facts to support his position that the 
statement was not made under the influence of the event: 
1. After the alleged victim returned home, she went about her normal duties. Trial 
Transcript P. 151,11.6-8; 
2. She was washing dishes when a family member noticed blood on her cloths. 
Trial Transcript P. 151,11. 6-8; 
3. When asked about the blood, the alleged victim indicated that it must be from 
her "period." Trial Transcript P. 151,11. 10-14; 
4. When the family member questioned that her "period" could not have been the 
source of the blood, she ran to the bathroom and started crying. Trial Transcript PP. 164-
165,11. 25-24; 
5. However, the family member also testified that the alleged victim started her 
period three or four days later. 
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The Appellant has satisfied his "duty and responsibility to support [his] allegations with 
adequate record." State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993). 
On the other hand, the State did not present to this Court any facts from the record 
to support its position that the victim's statements fell under the hearsay exception. If the 
State felt there was evidence presented at the preliminary hearing to support the Court's 
ruling, it could have requested a transcript of the hearing pursuant to Rule 11 (e)(3). The 
State failed to make such a Request. 
In addition, it should be noted that the State prepared the Order which was presented 
to the Court for signature regarding the Court's ruling and failed to support the finding with 
any facts which would support a finding that the alleged statements were made under the 
influence of the event. 
Finally, the State has taken the unsupported position that the startling event may have 
been the victim's knowledge that the blood was from a serious injury and not from her 
menstrual cycle. There is nothing in the record to support such a speculative assertion. If 
there is such evidence, the State has the burden to provide the support from the record.1 
The Appellee failed to address in any manner the second aspect of Appellant's 
position that the Trial Court erred by allowing the officer to provide a full account of all the 
apparently, the State has abandoned this argument that the statement was an excited 
utterance because the "stressful event may very well not have been the rape at all but the 
child's realization subsequent thereto that her severe bleeding was not due to her menstrual 
cycle but to serious injuries she sustained during the rape." Brief of Appellee, p. 10. 
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alleged victim's statements. Consequently this Court should find for the Appellant in that 
the trial court erred in allowing Officer Kimball to testify to all of the alleged victim's 
statements during the night in question. 
The State also indicates that the Court admitted the alleged victim's hearsay 
statements to the officer pursuant to Utah Code Section 76-5-411(2). A careful reading of 
the Court's Order, however, does not support the State's position. The Order does not even 
attempt to comply with 76-5-411(2), which states in part as follows: 
Prior to admission of any statement into evidence under this section, the judge shall 
determine whether the interest of justice will best be served by admission of that 
statement. In making this determination the judge shall consider the age and 
maturity of the child, the nature and duration of the abuse, the relationship of the 
child to the offender, and the reliability of the assertion and of the child. [Emphasis 
added] 
The Court never performed this legally required analysis before admitting the unrecorded 
hearsay statement. This failure alone justifies overturning the guilty verdict and an order for 
a new trial. See, State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862 (Utah 1989). 
Finally, the State argues that the Appellant did not preserve his objection by raising 
the objection to the admission at the trial level. The court conducted a contested hearing on 
the admissibility of the "excited utterance" statement on April 25, 2002. R. 137-138. 
During that hearing, the Appellant objected to the admissibility of the statement. (R. 314:5) 
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Based upon the above, the Court erred in allowing the out-of-court statement 
pursuant to the excited utterance exception. Even if the Court did not err, the Court should 
not have allowed the officer to testify about all of the victim's statements. 
B. Video Recording 
As to the video recording, the Appellant asserts that the Trial Court erred in allowing 
the video tape to be presented for evidentiary purposes. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 
15.5 require that the video be of such a quality that the jury can easily ascertain what is being 
said and by whom. The prerequisites of Rule 15.5 can never be met, as is the situation here, 
when the video tape is of such a poor quality that the jury listening to the tape is forced to 
declare to the judge that they are "at a loss as to what is being said." 
Again, the Appellee counters the Appellant's position by arguing that the Appellant 
failed to provide this Court a transcript of the preliminary hearing and a copy of the video 
tape in question. 
The Appellant, however, complied with Utah Rules of 11 (e)(1) by providing this 
appellate court the transcript of which he "deems necessary" to support his position that the 
video did not comply with the prerequisites of Rule 15.5. These facts are as follows: 
1. The jury was "at a loss as to what [was] being said." Trial transcript P. 24, 
1.22. 
2. the camera "itself [was] inserted into a clock, which was on the wall" that 
caused a ticking sound on the video making it difficult in some spots and 
impossible in others, to hear the interview. Trial transcript P. 23,11. 19-25. 
3. In fact, the ticking sound was very distracting, making it so difficult to 
ascertain what was being said that the Court allowed portions of the out-of-
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court statement to be read into the record from the transcript. Trial transcript 
P. 25,1117-25. 
On the other hand, the Appellee has not provided any facts from the record to support 
its position that the video complied with Rule 15.5. 
Finally, the State counters the Appellant's position by arguing that the Court did 
comply with the analysis mandated by Rule 15.5. The Appellant's position is articulated 
within his initial brief and will not be discussed further herein. 
C. Transcript 
The Appellant argued that it was error on part of the Trial Court to allow a reading 
of the transcript of the video into the record and to also allow the jury to review the 
transcript during the deliberation process. The Appellee counters the Appellant's position 
by arguing that the Appellant's claims were not preserved and/or were inadequately briefed. 
First, the State attempted to have the transcript admitted for the purpose of 
establishing certain elements of the offense. There is no dispute that the transcript was a 
recording of out-of-court statements. The transcript is clearly hearsay. See, Utah Rules of 
Evidence 801(c). The state has made no attempt to provide an exception to hearsay that 
would allow the hard copy of transcript or a reading of the transcript into the evidence. 
Instead, the state has elected to focus its position on arguing that the Appellant did not 
preserve his objection. 
The Appellant made the following objections to the transcripts at trial. First, the court 
conducted a contested hearing on the admissibility of the video tape on April 25,2002. R. 
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137-138. Second, when the State attempted to distribute the transcript to the jury, the 
Appellant objected of which the Court agreed. R. 313:22. Third, when the State attempted 
again to admit the video, the Appellant objected. R.313:171-172. Fourth, when the State 
asked the police officers to read a portion of the transcript into the record, the Appellant 
objected. R: 313:25 However, the Trial Court did not allow counsel to complete his 
objection by cutting in and overruling the objection. What is interesting to note is the reason 
the Court allowed the witness to read from the transcript: "the jury indicated they could not 
hear, and I think they'll have the video and the transcript." Id. In other words, since the jury 
could not understand what was being said on the video (which because of this reason never 
should have been admitted), the Court solved the problem by giving them additional 
inadmissable hearsay-the transcript. Two wrongs do not make a right. The result is a 
person was convicted of a 1st degree felony based solely on hearsay testimony. 
The Appellant objected to the video and transcript on at least four different occasions. 
The issue has been preserved. Even if it was not, it was plain error for the Court to allow 
the jury to view the video, allow the officer then to read from the record, and allow the 
transcript into the jury room and finally allow the officer to restate the victim's statements 
through the excited utterance exception. 
D. Leading Questions 
Again, the State does not in any manner dispute the merits of Appellant's position 
that the questions presented to the victim on the video tape were very leading and would 
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never have been permitted if asked at court. Based upon this the Court should grant the 
Appellant's request that he be allowed a new trial. 
In response, the Appellee has argued that the Appellant did not preserve the issue 
and/or did not argue plain error. If the Court finds that the Appellant did not preserve this 
issue, he affirmatively asserts, as previously supported, that it was plain error to allow the 
testimony. 
2. It was reversible error to allow an uncle and niece (by marriage) to serve 
together on the jury; 
Again, the State does not in any manner dispute the merits of the Appellant's position 
that it was reversible error to allow an uncle and niece to serve together on the jury. Based 
upon this the Court should grant the Appellant's Request that he be allowed a new trial. 
In response, the Appellee has argued that the Appellant waived this issue and/or did 
not argue plain error. If the Court finds that the Appellant did not preserve this issue, he 
affirmatively asserts, as previously supported in his initial brief, that it was plain error to 
allow the uncle and niece to serve together on the jury. 
3. The Court should have granted Defendant's Motion for Leave to 
Withdraw as Counsel on April 25.2002; 
Again, the State does not in any manner dispute the merits of the Appellant's position 
that the Trial Court should have granted the Defendant's motion for leave to withdraw as 
counsel. Based upon this the Court should grant the Appellant's request that he be allowed 
a new trial. 
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In response, the Appellee has argued that the Appellant waived this issue and/or did 
not argue plain error. If the Court finds that the Appellant did not preserve this issue, he 
affirmatively asserts, as previously supported, that it was plain error not to grant the 
Appellant's motion for leave to withdraw as counsel. 
4. The State violated the Appellant's Right to Remain Silent by allowing 
testimony that indicated that he exercised his right to remain silent: 
Again, the State does not in any manner dispute the merits of Appellant's position 
that his right to remain silent was violated by allowing testimony that indicated that he had 
exercised his right to remain silent. Based upon this the Court should grant the Appellant's 
request that he be allowed a new trial. 
In response, the Appellee has argued that the Appellant waived this issue and/or did 
not argue plain error. If the Court finds that the Appellant did not preserve this issue, he 
affirmatively asserts, as previously supported in his initial brief, that it was plain error to 
allow the testimony. 
5. Whether or not the Court improperly allowed hearsay testimony into 
evidence. 
Again, the State does not in any manner dispute the merits of Appellant's position 
that the Court improperly allowed hearsay testimony into evidence. Based upon this the 
Court should grant the Appellant's Request that he be allowed a new trial. 
In response, the Appellee has argued that the Appellant waived this issue and/or did 
not argue plain error and if the hearsay was improper, it was harmless error. If the Court 
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finds that the Appellant did not preserve this issue, he affirmatively asserts, as previously 
supported in his initial brief, that it was plain error to allow the testimony. 
It is also important to note that the State argues that the admission of hearsay 
statements was harmless error "given the compelling evidence of defendant's guilt." 
Amended Brief of Appellee, p. 42. However, the support the State gives of this "compelling 
guilt" consists entirely of hearsay statements. The fact that only hearsay evidence was used 
to convict this Defendant is very disturbing. There should be some direct testimony and/or 
physical evidence to support the State's position that the guilty verdict was justified. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the arguments presented above, this Court should overturn the jury's 
verdict of guilty and send the matter back to the trial court for a new trial. 
DATED this ^ ^ day of September, 2003. 
James K. Slavens, Esq. 
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